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Abstract
Background: Mere possibility is not an adequate basis for asserting scientific plausibility.
A precisely defined universal bound is needed beyond which the assertion of plausibility, particularly
in life-origin models, can be considered operationally falsified. But can something so seemingly
relative and subjective as plausibility ever be quantified? Amazingly, the answer is, “Yes.” A method
of objectively measuring the plausibility of any chance hypothesis (The Universal Plausibility Metric
[UPM]) is presented. A numerical inequality is also provided whereby any chance hypothesis can be
definitively falsified when its UPM metric of ξ is < 1 (The Universal Plausibility Principle [UPP]).
Both UPM and UPP pre-exist and are independent of any experimental design and data set.
Conclusion: No low-probability hypothetical plausibility assertion should survive peer-review
without subjection to the UPP inequality standard of formal falsification (ξ < 1).
The seemingly subjective liquidity of
“plausibility”
Are there any objective standards that could be applied to
evaluate the seemingly subjective notion of plausibility?
Can something so psychologically relative as plausibility
ever be quantified?
Our skepticism about defining a precise, objective
Universal Plausibility Metric (UPM) stems from a healthy
realization of our finiteness [1], subjectivity [2], pre-
suppositional biases [3,4], and epistemological problem
[5]. We are rightly wary of absolutism. The very nature of
probability theory emphasizes gray-scales more than the
black and white extremes of p = 0 or 1.0. Our problem is
that extremely low probabilities can only asymptotically
approach impossibility. An extremely unlikely event’s
probability always remains at least slightly > 0. No matter
how many orders of magnitude is the negative exponent
of an event’s probability, that event or scenario techni-
cally cannot be considered impossible. Not even a
Universal Probability Bound [6-8] seems to establish
absolute theoretical impossibility. The fanatical pursuit
of absoluteness by finite subjective knowers is considered
counterproductive in post modern science. Open-mind-
edness to all possibilities is encouraged [9].
But at some point our reluctance to exclude any
possibility becomes stultifying to operational science
[10]. Falsification is critical to narrowing down the list of
serious possibilities [11]. Almost all hypotheses are
possible. Few of them wind up being helpful and
scientifically productive. Just because a hypothesis is
possible should not grant that hypothesis scientific
respectability. More attention to the concept of “infea-
sibility” has been suggested [12]. Millions of dollars in
astrobiology grant money have been wasted on scenarios
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that are possible, but plausibly bankrupt. The question
for scientific methodology should not be, “Is this
scenario possible?” The question should be, “Is this
possibility a plausible scientific hypothesis?” One chance
in 10200 is theoretically possible, but given maximum
cosmic probabilistic resources, such a possibility is
hardly plausible. With funding resources rapidly drying
up, science needs a foundational principle by which to
falsify a myriad of theoretical possibilities that are not
worthy of serious scientific consideration and modeling.
Proving a theory is considered technically unachievable
[11]. Few bench scientists realize that falsification has
also been shown by philosophers of science to be at best
technically suspect [13]. Nevertheless, operational
science has no choice but to proceed primarily by a
process of elimination through practical falsification of
competing models and theories.
Which model or theory best corresponds to the data?
[[14] (pg. 32-98)] [8]. Which model or theory best
predicts future interactions? Answering these questions is
made easier by eliminating implausible possibilities
from the list of theoretical possibilities. Great care
must be taken at this point, especially given the many
non intuitive aspects of scientifically addressable reality.
But operational science must proceed on the basis of
best-thus-far tentative knowledge. The human epistemo-
logical problem is quite real. But we cannot allow it to
paralyze scientific inquiry.
If it is true that we cannot know anything for certain, then
we have all the more reason to proceed on the basis of
the greatest “plausibility of belief” [15-19]. If human
mental constructions cannot be equated with objective
reality, we are all the more justified in pursuing the
greatest likelihood of correspondence of our knowledge
to the object of that knowledge–presumed ontological
being itself. Can we prove that objectivity exists outside
of our minds? No. Does that establish that objectivity
does not exist outside of our minds? No again. Science
makes its best progress based on the axioms that 1) an
objective reality independent of our minds does exist,
and 2) scientists’ collective knowledge can progressively
correspond to that objective reality. The human episte-
mological problem is kept in its proper place through a)
double-blind studies, b) groups of independent investi-
gators all repeating the same experiment, c) prediction
fulfillments, and d) the application of pristine logic
(taking linguistic fuzziness into account), and e) the
competition of various human ideas for best correspon-
dence to repeated independent observations.
The physical law equations and the deductive system of
mathematical rules that govern the manipulations of
those equations are all formally absolute. But the axioms
from which formal logic theory flows, and the decision
of when to consider mathematical equations universal
“laws” are not absolute. Acceptance of mathematical
axioms is hypothetico-deductively relative. Acceptance of
physical laws is inductively relative. The pursuit of
correspondence between presumed objective reality
and our knowledge of objective reality is laudable in
science. But not even the axioms of mathematics or the
laws of physics can be viewed as absolute. Science of
necessity proceeds tentatively on the basis of best-thus-
far subjective knowledge. At some admittedly relative
point, the scientific community agrees by consensus to
declare certain formal equations to be reliable descrip-
tors and predictors of future physicodynamic interac-
tions. Eventually the correspondence level between our
knowledge and our repeated observations of presumed
objective reality is considered adequate to make a
tentative commitment to the veracity of an axiom or
universal law until they are proven otherwise.
The same standard should apply in falsifying ridicu-
lously implausible life-origin assertions. Combinatorial
imaginings and hypothetical scenarios can be endlessly
argued simply on the grounds that they are theoretically
possible. But there is a point beyond which arguing the
plausibility of an absurdly low probability becomes
operationally counterproductive. That point can actually
be quantified for universal application to all fields of
science, not just astrobiology. Quantification of a UPM
and application of the UPP inequality test to that specific
UPM provides for definitive, unequivocal falsification of
scientifically unhelpful and functionally useless hypoth-
eses. When the UPP is violated, declaring falsification of
that highly implausible notion is just as justified as the
firm commitment we make to any mathematical axiom
or physical “law” of motion.
Universal Probability Bounds
“Statistical prohibitiveness” in probability theory and
the physical sciences has remained a nebulous concept
for far too long. The importance of probabilistic
resources as a context for consideration of extremely
low probabilities has been previously emphasized [[20]
(pg. 13-17)] [6-8,21]. Statistical prohibitiveness cannot
be established by an exceedingly low probability alone
[6]. Rejection regions and probability bounds need to be
established independent of (preferably prior to) experi-
mentation in any experimental design. But the setting of
these zones and bounds is all too relative and variable
from one experimental design to the next. In the end,
however, probability is not the critical issue. The
plausibility of hypotheses is the real issue. Even more
important is the question of whether we can ever
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operationally falsify a preposterous but theoretically
possible hypothesis.
The Universal Probability Bound (UPB) [6,7] quantifies
the maximum cosmic probabilistic resources (Ω, upper
case omega) as the context of evaluation of any
extremely low probability event. Ω corresponds to the
maximum number of possible probabilistic trials
(quantum transitions or physicochemical interactions)
that could have occurred in cosmic history. The value of
Ω is calculated by taking the product of three factors:
1) The number of seconds that have elapsed since the
Big Bang (1017) assumes a cosmic age of around 14
billions years. 60 sec/min × 60 min/hr × 24 hrs/day ×
365 days per year × 14 billion years = 4.4 × 1017
seconds since the Big Bang.
2) The number of possible quantum events/transi-
tions per second is derived from the amount of time
it takes for light to traverse the minimum unit of
distance. The minimum unit of distance (a quantum
of space) is Planck length (10-33 centimeters). The
minimum amount of time required for light to
traverse the Plank length is Plank time (10-43
seconds) [[6-8], pg 215-217]. Thus a maximum of
1043 quantum transitions can take place per second.
Since 1017 seconds have elapsed since the Big Bang,
the number of possible quantum transitions since the
Big Bang would be 1043 × 1017 = 1060.
3) Sir Arthur Eddington’s estimate of the number of
protons, neutrons and electrons in the observable
cosmos (1080) [22] has been widely respected
throughout the scientific literature for decades now.
Some estimates of the total number of elementary
particles have been slightly higher. The Universe is 95
billion light years (30 gigaparsecs) across. We can
convert this to cubic centimeters using the equation
for the volume of a sphere (5 × 1086 cc). If we
multiply this times 500 particles (100 neutrinos and
400 photons) per cc, we would get 2.5 × 1089
elementary particles in the visible universe.
A Universal Probability Bound could therefore be
calculated by the product of these three factors:
1017 × 1043 × 1080 = 10140
If the highest estimate of the number of elementary
particles in the Universe is used (e.g., 1089), the UPB
would be 10149.
The UPB’s discussed above are the highest calculated
universal probability bounds ever published by many orders of
magnitude [7,8,12]. They are the most permissive of
(favorable to) extremely low-probability plausibility
assertions in print [6] [[8] (pg. 216-217)]. All other
proposed metrics of probabilistic resources are far
less permissive of low-probability chance-hypothesis
plausibility assertions. Emile Borel’s limit of cosmic
probabilistic resources was only 1050 [[23] (pg. 28-30)].
Borel based this probability bound in part on the
product of the number of observable stars (109) times
the number of possible human observations that could
be made on those stars (1020). Physicist Bret Van de
Sande at the University of Pittsburgh calculates a UPB of
2.6 × 1092 [8,24]. Cryptographers tend to use the figure
of 1094 computational steps as the resource limit to any
cryptosystem’s decryption [25]. MIT’s Seth Lloyd has
calculated that the universe could not have performed
more than 10120 bit operations in its history [26].
Here we must point out that a discussion of the number
of cybernetic or cryptographic “operations” is totally
inappropriate in determining a prebiotic UPB. Probabil-
istic combinatorics has nothing to do with “operations.”
Operations involve choice contingency [27-29]. Bits are
“Yes/No” question opportunities [[30] (pg. 66)], each of
which could potentially reduce the total number of
combinatorial possibilities (2NH possible biopolymers:
see Appendix 1) by half. But of course asking the right
question and getting an answer is not a spontaneous
physicochemical phenomenon describable by mere
probabilistic uncertainty measures [31-33]. Any binary
“operation” involves a bona fide decision node [34-36].
An operation is a formal choice-based function. Shannon
uncertainty measures do not apply to specific choices
[37-39]. Bits measure only the number of non distinct,
generic, potential binary choices, not actual specific
choices [37]. Inanimate nature cannot ask questions,
get answers, and exercise choice contingency at decision
nodes in response to those answers. Inanimate nature
cannot optimize algorithms, compute, pursue formal
function, or program configurable switches to achieve
integration and shortcuts to formal utility [28]. Cyber-
netic operations therefore have no bearing whatever in
determining universal probability bounds for chance
hypotheses.
Agreement on a sensible UPB in advance of (or at least
totally independent of) any specific hypothesis, sug-
gested scenario, or theory of mechanism is critical to
experimental design. No known empirical or rational
considerations exist to preclude acceptance of the above
UPB. The only exceptions in print seem to come from
investigators who argue that the above UPB is too
permissive of the chance hypothesis [8,12]. Faddish
acceptance prevails of hypothetical scenarios of extre-
mely low probability simply because they are in vogue
and are theoretically possible. Not only a UPB is needed,
but a fixed universal mathematical standard of plausibility
is needed. This is especially true for complex hypothe-
tical scenarios involving joint and/or conditional prob-
abilities. Many imaginative hypothetical scenarios
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propose constellations of highly cooperative events that
are theorized to self-organize into holistic formal
schemes. Whether joint, conditional or independent,
multiple probabilities must be factored into an overall
plausibility metric. In addition, a universal plausibility
bound is needed to eliminate overly imaginative
fantasies from consideration for the best inference to
causation.
The Universal Plausibility Metric (UPM)
To be able to definitively falsify ridiculously implausible
hypotheses, we need first a Universal Plausibility Metric
(UPM) to assign a numerical plausibility value to each
proposed hypothetical scenario. Second, a Universal
Plausibility Principle (UPP) inequality is needed as
plausibility bound of this measurement for falsification
evaluation. We need a cut-off point beyond which no
extremely low probability scenario can be considered a
“scientifically respectable” possibility. What is needed
more than a probability bound is a plausibility bound.
Any “possibility” that exceeds the ability of its probabil-
istic resources to generate should immediately be
considered a “functional non possibility,” and therefore
an implausible scenario. While it may not be a
theoretically absolute impossibility, if it exceeds its
probabilistic resources, it is a gross understatement to
declare that such a proposed scenario is simply not
worth the expenditure of serious scientific consideration,
pursuit, and resources. Every field of scientific investiga-
tion, not just biophysics and life-origin science, needs
the application of the same independent test of
credibility to judge the plausibility of its hypothetical
events and scenarios. The application of this standard
should be an integral component of the scientific
method itself for all fields of scientific inquiry.
To arrive at the UPM, we begin with the maximum
available probabilistic resources discussed above (Ω,
upper case Omega) [6,7]. But Ω could be considered
from a quantum or a classical molecular/chemical
perspective. Thus this paper proposes that the Ω
quantification be broken down first according to the
Level (L) or perspective of physicodynamic analysis (LΩ),
where the perspective at the quantum level is represented
by the superscript “q” (qΩ) and the perspective at the
classical level is represented by “c” (cΩ). Each represents
the maximum probabilistic resources available at each
level of physical activity being evaluated, with the total
number of quantum transitions being much larger than
the total number of “ordinary” chemical reactions since
the Big Bang.
Second, the maximum probabilistic resources LΩ (qΩ for
the quantum level and cΩ for classical molecular/
chemical level) can be broken down even further
according to the astronomical subset being addressed
using the general subscript “A” for Astronomical: LΩA
(representing both qΩA and
cΩA). The maximum
probabilistic resources can then be measured for each
of the four different specific environments of each LΩ,
where the general subscript A is specifically enumerated
with “u” for universe, “g” for our galaxy, “s” for our solar
system, and “e” for earth:
Universe  
Galaxy  
Solar System  














Ω Ω( des meteorite and panspermia inoculations)
To include meteorite and panspermia inoculations in the
earth metrics, we use the Solar System metrics LΩs (
qΩs
and cΩs).
As examples, for quantification of the maximum
probabilistic resources at the quantum level for the
astronomical subset of our galactic phase space, we
would use the qΩg metric. For quantification of the
maximum probabilistic resources at the ordinary classi-
cal molecular/chemical reaction level in our solar
system, we would use the cΩs metric.
The most permissive UPM possible would employ the
probabilistic resources symbolized by qΩu where both
the quantum level perspective and the entire universe are
considered.
The sub division between the LΩA for the quantum
perspective (quantified by qΩA) and that for the classical
molecular/chemical perspective (quantified by cΩA),
however, is often not as clear and precise as we might
wish. Crossovers frequently occur. This is particularly
true where quantum events have direct bearing on
“ordinary” chemical reactions in the “everyday” classical
world. If we are going to err in evaluating the plausibility
of any hypothetical scenario, let us err in favor of
maximizing the probabilistic resources of LΩA. In cases
where quantum factors seem to directly affect chemical
reactions, we would want to use the four quantum level




qΩe) to preserve the
plausibility of the lowest-probability explanations.
Quantification of the Universal Plausibility
Metric (UPM)
The computed Universal Plausibility Metric (UPM)
objectively quantifies the level of plausibility of any
chance hypothesis or theory. The UPM employs the
symbol ξ (Xi, pronounced zai in American English, sai in
UK English, ksi in modern Greek) to represent the
computed UPM according to the following equation:
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ξ ω=
f L AΩ (1)
where f represents the number of functional objects/
events/scenarios that are known to occur out of all
possible combinations (lower case omega, ω) (e.g.,
the number [f] of functional protein family members
of varying sequence known to occur out of sequence
space [ω]), and LΩA (upper case Omega, Ω) represents
the total probabilistic resources for any particular
probabilistic context. The “L” superscript context of Ω
describes which perspective of analysis, whether
quantum (q) or a classical (c), and the “A” subscript
context of Ω enumerates which subset of astronom-
ical phase space is being evaluated: “u” for universe,
“g” for our galaxy, “s” for our solar system, and “e”
for earth. Note that the basic generic UPM (ξ)
equation’s form remains constant despite changes
in the variables of levels of perspective (L: whether q
or c) and astronomic subsets (A: whether u, g, s, or e).
The calculations of probabilistic resources in LΩA can be
found in Appendix 2. Note that the upper and lower case
omega symbols used in this equation are case sensitive
and each represents a completely different phase space.
The UPM from both the quantum (qΩA) and classical
molecular/chemical (cΩA) perspectives/levels can be
quantified by Equation 1. This equation incorporates
the number of possible transitions or physical interactions that
could have occurred since the Big Bang. Maximum
quantum-perspective probabilistic resources qΩu were
enumerated above in the discussion of a UPB [6,7] [[8]
(pg. 215-217)]. Here we use basically the same approach
with slight modifications to the factored probabilistic
resources that comprise Ω.
Let us address the quantum level perspective (q) first for
the entire universe (u) followed by three astronomical
subsets: our galaxy (g), our solar system (s) and earth (e).
Since approximately 1017 seconds have elapsed since the
Big Bang, we factor that total time into the following
calculations of quantum perspective probabilistic
resource measures. Note that the difference between
the age of the earth and the age of the cosmos is only a
factor of 3. A factor of 3 is rather negligible at the high
order of magnitude of 1017 seconds since the Big Bang
(versus age of the earth). Thus, 1017 seconds is used for
all three astronomical subsets:
 Universe trans sec secs protons neutronsq uΩ = = × ×10 10 10








= = × × =
=
10
10 10 10 10
140
43 17 67 127Ω
Ω  System
 Earthq e
= × × =
= = × × =
10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10
43 17 57 117
43 17 42 1Ω 02
These above limits of probabilistic resources exist within
the only known universe that we can repeatedly observe–
the only universe that is scientifically addressable. Wild
metaphysical claims of an infinite number of cosmoses
may be fine for cosmological imagination, religious
belief, or superstition. But such conjecturing has no
place in hard science. Such claims cannot be empirically
investigated, and they certainly cannot be falsified. They
violate Ockham’s (Occam’s) Razor [40]. No prediction
fulfillments are realizable. They are therefore nothing
more than blind beliefs that are totally inappropriate in
peer-reviewed scientific literature. Such cosmological
conjectures are far closer to metaphysical or philosophic
enterprises than they are to bench science.
From a more classical perspective at the level of ordinary
molecular/chemical reactions, we will again provide
metrics first for the entire universe (u) followed by
three astronomical subsets, our galaxy (g), our solar
system (s) and earth (e).
The classical molecular/chemical perspective makes two
primary changes from the quantum perspective. With the
classical perspective, the number of atoms rather than the
number of protons, neutrons and electrons is used. In
addition, the total number of classical chemical reactions that
could have taken place since the Big Bang is used rather than
transitions related to cubic light-Planck’s. The shortest
time any transition requires before a chemical reaction
can take place is 10 femtoseconds [41-46]. A femtosecond
is 10-15 seconds. Complete chemical reactions, however,
rarely take place faster than the picosecond range (10-12
secs). Most biochemical reactions, even with highly
sophisticated enzymatic catalysis, take place no faster
than the nano (10-9) and usually the micro (10-6) range.
To be exceedingly generous (perhaps overly permissive of
the capabilities of the chance hypothesis), we shall use
100 femtoseconds as the shortest chemical reaction time.
100 femtoseconds is 10-13 seconds. Thus 1013 simple and
fastest chemical reactions could conceivably take place
per second in the best of theoretical pipe-dream scenarios.
The four cΩA measures are as follows:













= = × × =
= = × ×
10 10 10 10
10 10
13 17 66 96
13 17 10 10
10 10 10 10
55 85
13 17 40 70
=
= = × × = Earthc eΩ
Remember that LΩe excludes meteorite and panspermia
inoculations. To include meteorite and panspermia
inoculations, we use the metric for our solar system cΩs.
These maximum metrics of the limit of probabilistic
resources are based on the best-thus-far estimates of a
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large body of collective scientific investigations. We can
expect slight variations up or down of our best guesses of
the number of elementary particles in the universe, for
example. But the basic formula presented as the Universal
Plausibility Metric (PM) will never change. The Universal
Plausibility Principle (UPP) inequality presented below is
also immutable and worthy of law-like status. It affords
the ability to objectively once and for all falsify not just
highly improbable, but ridiculously implausible scenar-
ios. Slight adjustments to the factors that contribute to the
value of each LΩA are straightforward and easy for the
scientific community to update through time.
Most chemical reactions take longer by many orders of
magnitude than what these exceedingly liberal max-
imum probabilistic resources allow. Biochemical reac-
tions can take years to occur in the absence of highly
sophisticated protein enzymes not present in a prebiotic
environment. Even humanly engineered ribozymes
rarely catalyze reactions by an enhancement rate of
more than 105 [47-51]. Thus the use of the fastest rate
known for any complete chemical reaction (100 femto-
seconds) seems to be the most liberal/forgiving prob-
ability bound that could possibly be incorporated into
the classical chemical probabilistic resource perspective
cΩA. For this reason, we should be all the more ruthless
in applying the UPP test of falsification presented below
to seemingly “far-out” metaphysical hypotheses that
have no place in responsible science.
Falsification using The Universal Plausibility
Principle (UPP)
The Universal Plausibility Principle (UPP) states that
definitive operational falsification of any chance hypothesis
is provided by the inequality of:
ξ < 1 1Inequality #
This definitive operational falsification holds for hypoth-
eses, theories, models, or scenarios at any level of
perspective (q or c) and for any astronomical subset
(u, g, s, and e). The UPP inequality’s falsification is valid
whether the hypothesized event is singular or com-
pound, independent or conditional. Great care must be
taken, however, to eliminate errors in the calculation of
complex probabilities. Every aspect of the hypothesized
scenario must have its probabilistic components factored
into the one probability (p) that is used in the UPM (See
equation 2 below). Many such combinatorial possibi-
lities are joint or conditional. It is not sufficient to factor
only the probabilities of each reactant’s formation, for
example, while omitting the probabilistic aspects of each
reactant being presented at the same place and time,
becoming available in the required reaction order, or
being able to react at all (activated vs. not activated).
Other factors must be included in the calculation of
probabilities: optical isomers, non-peptide bond forma-
tion, many non biological amino acids that also react
[8]. The exact calculation of such probabilities is often
not straightforward. But in many cases it becomes readily
apparent that whatever the exact multi-factored calcula-
tion, the probability “p” of the entire scenario easily
crosses the plausibility bound provided by the UPP
inequality. This provides a definitive objective standard
of falsification. When ξ < 1, immediately the notion
should be considered “not a scientifically plausible
possibility.” A ξ value < 1 should serve as an unequivocal
operational falsification of that hypothesis. The hypothe-
tical scenario or theory generating that ξ metric should
be excluded from the differential list of possible causes.
The hypothetical notion should be declared to be
outside the bounds of scientific respectability. It should
be flatly rejected as the equivalent of superstition.
f/ω in Equation 1 is in effect the probability of a particular
functional event or object occurring out of all possible
combinations. Take for example an RNA-World model.
23 different functional ribozymes in the same family
might arise out of 1015 stochastic ensembles of 50-mer
RNAs. This would reduce to a probability p of roughly
10-14 of getting a stochastic ensemble that manifested
some degree of that ribozyme family’s function.
Thus f/ω in Equation 1 reduces to the equivalent of a
probability p:
UPM c e= = p Ω (2)
where “p” represents an extremely low probability of
any chance hypothesis that is asserted to be plausible
given LΩA probabilistic resources, in this particular
case cΩe probabilistic resources.
As examples of attempts to falsify, suppose we have three
different chance hypotheses, each with its own low
probability (p), all being evaluated from the quantum
perspective at the astronomical level of the entire
universe (qΩu). Given the three different probabilities
(p) provided below, the applied UPP inequality for each
ξ = p qΩu of each hypothetical scenario would establish
definitive operational falsification for one of these three
hypothetical scenarios, and fail to falsify two others:
p = × = = <−10 10 10 1 1140 140 0  giving a  which is NOT  so NOT falξ , sified
 giving a  so NOT falsifiedp
p
= × = >−10 10 10 1130 140 10 ξ ,
= × × = × <− −3 7 10 10 3 7 10 1151 140 11. . , giving a  so Falsifiedξ
Let us quantify an example of the use of the UPM and
UPP to attempt falsification of a chance hypothetical
scenario:
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Suppose 103 biofunctional polymeric sequences of mono-
mers (f) exist out of 1017 possible sequences in sequence
space (ω) all of the same number (N) of monomers. That
would correspond to one chance in 1014 of getting a
functional sequence by chance (p = 103/1017 = 1/1014 =
10-14 of getting a functional sequence). If we were
measuring the UPM from the perspective of a classical
chemical view on earth over the last 5 billion years (cΩe =
1070), we would use the following UPM equation (#1











Since ξ > 1, this particular chance hypothesis is shown
unequivocally to be plausible and worthy of further
scientific investigation.
As one of the reviewers of this manuscript has pointed out,
however, we might find the sequence space ω, and
therefore the probability space f/ω, to be radically different
for abiogenesis than for general physico-chemical reac-
tions. The sequence space ω must include factors such as
heterochirality, unwanted non-peptide-bond formation,
and the large number of non biological amino acids
present in any prebiotic environment [8,12]. This greatly
increases ω, and would tend to substantially reduce the
probability p of naturalistic abiogenesis. Spontaneously
biofunctional stochastic ensemble formation was found to
be only 1 in 1064 when TEM-1 b-lactamase’s working
domain of around 150 amino acids was used as a model
[52]. Function was related to the hydropathic signature
necessary for proper folding (tertiary structure). The ability
to confer any relative degree of beta-lactam penicillin-like
antibiotic resistance to bacteria was considered to define
“biofunctional” in this study. Axe further measured the
probability of a random 150-residue primary structure
producing any short protein, despite many allowable
monomeric substitutions, to be 10-74. This probability is
an example of a scientifically determined p that should be
incorporated into any determination of the UPM in
abiogenesis models.
Don’t multiverse models undermine The UPP?
Multiverse models imagine that our universe is only one
of perhaps countless parallel universes [53-55]. Appeals
to the Multiverse worldview are becoming more popular
in life-origin research as the statistical prohibitiveness of
spontaneous generation becomes more incontrovertible
in a finite universe [56-58]. The term “notion,” however,
is more appropriate to refer to multiverse speculation
than “theory.” The idea of multiple parallel universes
cannot legitimately qualify as a testable scientific
hypothesis, let alone a mature theory. Entertaining
multiverse “thought experiments” almost immediately
takes us beyond the domain of responsible science into
the realm of pure metaphysical belief and conjecture.
The dogma is literally “beyond physics and astronomy,”
the very meaning of the word “metaphysical."
The notion of multiverse has no observational support,
let alone repeated observations. Empirical justification is
completely lacking. It has no testability: no falsification
potential exists. If provides no prediction fulfillments.
The non parsimonious construct of multiverse grossly
violates the principle of Ockham’s (Occam’s) Razor [40].
No logical inference seems apparent to support the
strained belief other than a perceived need to rationalize
what we know is statistically prohibitive in the only
universe that we do experience. Multiverse fantasies tend
to constitute a back-door fire escape for when our
models hit insurmountable roadblocks in the observable
cosmos. When none of the facts fit our favorite model,
we conveniently create imaginary extra universes that are
more accommodating. This is not science. Science is
interested in falsification within the only universe that
science can address. Science cannot operate within
mysticism, blind belief, or superstition. A multiverse
may be fine for theoretical metaphysical models. But no
justification exists for inclusion of this “dream world” in
the sciences of physics and astronomy.
It could be argued that multiverse notions arose only in
response to the severe time and space constraints arising
out of Hawking, Ellis and Penrose’s singularity theorems
[59-61]. Solutions in general relativity involve singula-
rities wherein matter is compressed to a point in space
and light rays originate from a curvature. These theorems
place severe limits on time and space since the Big Bang.
Many of the prior assumptions of limitless time and
sample space in naturalistic models were eliminated by
the demonstration that time and space in the cosmos are
quite finite, not infinite. For instance, we only have 1017-
1018 seconds at most to work with in any responsible
cosmological universe model since the Big Bang.
Glansdorff makes the point, “Conjectures about emer-
gence of life in an infinite multiverse should not confuse
probability with possibility.” [62]
Even if multiple physical cosmoses existed, it is a
logically sound deduction that linear digital genetic
instructions using a representational material symbol
system (MSS) [63] cannot be programmed by the chance
and/or fixed laws of physicodynamics [27-29,32,33,
36,39,64,65]. This fact is not only true of the physical
universe, but would be just as true in any imagined
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physical multiverse. Physicality cannot generate non
physical Prescriptive Information (PI) [29]. Physicody-
namics cannot practice formalisms (The Cybernetic Cut)
[27,34]. Constraints cannot exercise formal control
unless those constraints are themselves chosen to
achieve formal function [28] (“Constraints vs. Controls”
currently in peer review). Environmental selection
cannot select at the genetic level of arbitrary symbol
sequencing (e.g., the polymerization of nucleotides and
codons). (The GS Principle [Genetic Selection Principle])
[36,64]. Polymeric syntax (sequencing; primary struc-
ture) prescribes future (potential; not-yet-existent) fold-
ing and formal function of small RNAs and DNA.
Symbol systems and configurable switch-settings can
only be programmed with choice contingency, not
chance contingency or fixed law, if non trivial coordina-
tion and formal organization are expected [29,38]. The
all-important determinative sequencing of monomers is
completed with rigid covalent bonds before any tran-
scription, translation, or three-dimensional folding
begins. Thus, imagining multiple physical universes or
infinite time does not solve the problem of the origin of
formal (non physical) biocybernetics and biosemiosis
using a linear digital representational symbol system.
The source of Prescriptive Information (PI) [29,35] in a
metaphysically presupposed material-only world is
closely related to the problem of gene emergence from
physicodynamics alone. The latter hurdles remain the
number-one enigmas of life-origin research [66].
The main subconscious motivation behind multiverse
conjecture seems to be, “Multiverse models can do
anything we want them to do to make our models work
for us.” We can argue Multiverse models ad infinitum
because their potential is limitless. The notion of Multi-
verse has great appeal because it can explain everything
(and therefore nothing). Multiverse models are beyond
scientific critique, falsification, and prediction fulfillment
verification. They are purely metaphysical.
Multiverse imaginings, therefore, offer no scientific
threat whatever to the universality of the UPM and
UPP in the only cosmic reality that science knows and
investigates.
Conclusion
Mere possibility is not an adequate basis for asserting
scientific plausibility. Indeed, the practical need exists in
science to narrow down lists of possibilities on the basis
of objectively quantifiable plausibility.
A numerically defined Universal Plausibility Metric
(UPM = ξ) has been provided in this paper. A numerical
inequality of ξ < 1 establishes definitive operational
falsification of any chance hypothesis (The Universal
Plausibility Principle [UPP]). Both UPM and UPP pre-
exist and are independent of any experimental design
and data set. No low-probability plausibility assertion
should survive peer-review without subjection to the
UPP inequality standard of formal falsification (ξ < 1).
The use of the UPM and application of the UPP
inequality to each specific UPM will promote clarity,
efficiency and decisiveness in all fields of scientific
methodology by allowing operational falsification of
ridiculously implausible plausibility assertions. The UPP
is especially important in astrobiology and all areas of
life-origin research where mere theoretical possibility is
often equated erroneously with plausibility. The applica-
tion of The Universal Plausibility Principle (UPP)
precludes the inclusion in scientific literature of wild
metaphysical conjectures that conveniently ignore or
illegitimately inflate probabilistic resources to beyond
the limits of observational science. The UPM and UPP
together prevent rapidly shrinking funding and labor
resources from being wasted on preposterous notions
that have no legitimate place in science. At best, notions
with ξ < 1 should be considered not only operationally
falsified hypotheses, but bad metaphysics on a plane
equivalent to blind faith and superstition.
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Appendix 1
2NH is the “practical” number (high probability group),
measured in bits, rather than the erroneous theoretical
nN as is usually published, of all possible biopolymeric
sequences that could form, where
N = the number of loci in the string (or monomers in
polymer)
n = the number of possible alphabetical symbols that
could be used at each locus (4 nucleotides, 64
codons, or 20 amino acids)
H = the Shannon uncertainty at each locus
For a 100 mer biopolymeric primary structure, the number
of sequence combinations is actually only 2.69 × 10-6 of
the theoretically possible and more intuitive measure of
nN sequences. The reason derives from the Shannon-
McMillan-Breiman Theorem [67-70] which is explained in
detail by Yockey [[71], pg 73-76].
Appendix 2
For best estimates of the number of atoms, protons,
neutrons and electrons in the universe and its astro-
nomical subsets, see [72].
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Simple arithmetic is needed for many of these calcula-
tions. For example, the mass of our galaxy is estimated to
be around 1012 solar masses. The mass of “normal
matter” in our galaxy is around 1011 solar masses. The
mass of the sun is about 2 × 1030 kg. The mass of our
solar system is surprisingly not much more than the
mass of the sun, still about 2 × 1030 kg. (The Sun
contains 99.85% of all the matter in the Solar System,
and the planets contain only 0.136% of the mass of the
solar system.) The mass of a proton or neutron is 1.7 ×
10-27 kg. Thus the number of protons & neutrons in our
solar system is around 2 × 1030/1.7 × 10-27 = 1.2 × 1057.
The number of electrons is about half of that, or 0.6 ×
1057. The number of protons, neutrons and electrons in
our solar system is therefore around 1.8 × 1057. The
number of protons, neutrons and electrons in our galaxy
is around 1.8 × 1068. We have crudely estimated a total
of 100 protons, neutrons and electrons on average per
atom. All of these estimates will of course vary some
through time as consensus evolves. But adjustments to
LΩA are easily updated with absolutely no change in the
Universal Plausibility Metric (UPM) equation or the
Universal Plausibility Principle (UPP) inequality. Defi-
nitive operational falsification still holds when ξ < 1.
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